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THE BATTLE OF CANNAE.
The battle of Cannae was the last great battle fought by Hannibal in
Italy. This conflict has been greatly celebrated in history, not only
for its magnitude, and the terrible desperation with which it was
fought, but also on account of the strong dramatic interest which the
circumstances at tending it are fitted to excite. The interest is
perhaps, however, quite as much due to the peculiar skill of the ancient
historian who narrates the story, as to the events themselves which he
records.
It was about a year after the close of the dictatorship of Fabius that
this battle was fought. That interval had been spent by the Roman
consuls who were in office during that time in various military
operations, which did not, however, lead to any decisive results. In the
mean time, there were great uneasiness, discontent, and dissatisfaction
at Rome. To have such a dangerous and terrible foe, at the head of forty
thousand men, infesting the vicinage of their city, ravaging the
territories of their friends and allies, and threatening continually to
attack the city itself, was a continual source of anxiety and vexation.
It mortified the Roman pride, too, to find that the greatest armies they
could raise, and the ablest generals they could choose and commission,
proved wholly unable to cope with the foe. The most sagacious of them,
in fact, had felt it necessary to decline the contest with him
altogether.
This state of things produced a great deal of ill humor in the city.
Party spirit ran very high; tumultuous assemblies were held; disputes
and contentions prevailed, and mutual criminations and recriminations
without end. There were two great parties formed: that of the middling
classes on one side, and the aristocracy on the other. The former were
called the Plebeians, the latter the Patricians. The division between
these two classes was very great and very strongly marked. There was, in
consequence of it, infinite difficulty in the election of consuls. At
last the consuls were chosen, one from each party. The name of the
patrician was Paulus AEmilius. The name of the plebeian was Varro. They
were inducted into office, and were thus put jointly into .possession of
a vast power, to wield which with any efficiency and success would seem
to require union sand harmony in those who held it, and yet AEmilius and
Varro were inveterate and implacable political foes. It was often so in
the Roman government. `The consulship was a double-headed monster, which
spent half its strength in bitter contests waged between its members.
The Romans determined now to make an effectual effort to rid themselves
of their foe. They raised an enormous army. It consisted of eight
legions. The Roman legion was an army of itself. It contained ordinarily
four thousand foot soldiers, and a troop of three hundred horsemen. It
was very unusual to have more than two or three legions in the field at
a time. The Romans, however, on this occasion, increased the number of
the legions, and also augmented, their size, so that they contained,
each, five thousand infantry and four hundred cavalry. They were
determined to make a great and last effort to defend their city, and
save the commonwealth from ruin. AEmilius and Varro prepared to take
command of this great force, with very strong determinations to make it
the means of Hannibal's destruction.
The characters of the two commanders, however, as well as their
political connections, were very dissimilar, and they soon began to
manifest a very different spirit, and to assume a very different air and
bearing, each from the other. AEmilius was a friend of Fabius, and
approved of his policy. Varro was for greater promptness and decision.
He made great promises, and spoke with the utmost confidence of being
able to annihilate Hannibal at a blow. He condemned the policy of Fabius
in attempting to wear out the enemy by delays. He said it was a plan of
the aristocratic party to protract the war, in order to put themselves
in high offices, and perpetuate their importance and influence. The war
might have been ended long ago, he said; and he would promise the people
that he would now end it, without fail, the very day that he came in
sight of Hannibal.
As for AEmilius, he assumed a very different tone. He was surprised, he
said, that any man could pretend to decide before he had even left the
city, and while he was, of course, entirely ignorant, both of the
condition of their own army, and of the position, and designs, and
strength of the enemy, how soon and under what circumstances it would be
wise to give him battle. Plans must be formed in adaptation to
circumstances, as circumstances can not be made to alter to suit plans.
He believed that they should succeed in the encounter with Hannibal, but
he thought that their only hope of success must be
based on the exercise of prudence, caution, and sagacity; he was sure
that rashness and folly could only lead in future, as they had always
done in the past, to discomfiture and ruin.
It is said that Fabius, the former dictator, conversed with AEmilius
before his departure for the army, and gave him such counsel as his age
and experience, and his knowledge of the character and operations of
Hannibal, suggested to his mind. "If you had a colleague like yourself,"
said he, " I wouldy not offer you any advice; you would not need it.
"Or, if you were yourself like your colleague, vain, self-conceited, and
presumptuous, then I would be silent; counsel would be thrown away upon
you. But as it is, while you have great judgment and ' - sagacity to
guide you, you are to be placed in a situation of extreme difficulty and
peril. If I am not mistaken, the greatest difficulty you will have to
encounter will not be the open enemy you are going to meet upon the
field. You will find, I think, that Varro will give you quite as much
trouble as Hannibal. He will be presumptuous, reckless, and head strong.
He will inspire all the rash and ardent young men in the army with his
own enthusiastic folly, and we shall be very fortunate if we do not yet
see the terrible and bloody scenes of Lake Trasimene acted again. I am
sure that the true policy for us to adopt is the one which I marked out.
That is always the proper course for the invaded to pursue with
invaders, where there is the least doubt of the success of a battle. We
grow strong while Hannibal grows continually weaker by delay. He can
only prosper so long as he can fight battles and perform brilliant
exploits. If we deprive him of this power, his strength will be
continually wasting away, and the spirit and courage of his men waning.
He has now scarce a third part of the army which he had when he crossed
the lberus, and nothing can save this remnant from destruction if we are
wise."
AEmilius said, in reply to this, that he went into the contest with very
little of encouragement or hope. If Fabius had found it so difficult to
withstand the turbulent influences of his master of horse, who was his
subordinate officer, and, as such, under his command, how could he
expect to restrain his colleague, who was entitled, by his office, to
full equality with him. But, notwithstanding the difficulties which he
foresaw, he was going to do his duty, and abide by the result; and if
the result should be unfavorable, he should seek for death in the
conflict, for death by Carthaginian spears was a far lighter evil, in
his, view, than the displeasure and censures of his countrymen.
The consuls departed from Rome to join the army, AEmilius attended by a
moderate number of men of rank and station, and Varro by a much larger
train, though it was formed of people of the lower classes of society.
The army was organized, and the arrangements of the encampments
perfected. One ceremony was that of administering an oath to the
soldiers, as was usual in the Roman armies at the e commencement of a
campaign. They were made to swear that they would not desert the army,
that they would never abandon the post at which they were stationed in
fear or in flight, nor leave the ranks except for the purpose of taking
up or recovering a weapon, striking an enemy, or protecting a friend.
These and other arrangements being completed, the army was ready for the
field. The consuls made a different arrangement in respect to the
division of their power from that adopted by Fabius and Flaminius. It
was agreed between them that they would exercise their common authority
alternately, each for a day.
In the mean time, Hannibal began to find himself reduced to great
difficulty in obtaining provisions for k4` his men. The policy of Fabius
had been so far successful as to place him in a very embarrassing
situation, and one growing more and more embarrassing every day. He
could obtain no food except what he got by plunder, and there was now
very little opportunity for that, as the inhabitants of the country had
carried of all the grain and deposited it in strongly-fortified towns;
and though Hannibal had great confidence in his power to cope with the
Roman army in a regular battle on an open field, he had not strength
sufficient to reduce citadels or attack fortified camps. His stock of
provisions had become, therefore, more and more nearly exhausted, until
now he had a supply for only ten days, and he saw no possible mode of
increasing it.
His great object was, therefore, to bring on a battle. Varro was ready
and willing to give him battle, but AEmilius, or, to call him by his
name in full, Paulus AEmilius, which is the appellation by which he is
more frequently known, was very desirous to persevere in the Fabian
policy till the ten days had expired, after which he knew that Hannibal
must be reduced to extreme distress, and might have to surrender at once
to save his army from actual famine. In fact, it was said that the
troops were on such short allowance as to produce great discontent, and
that a large body of Spaniards were preparing to desert and go over
together to the Roman camp.
Things were in this state, when, one day, Hannibal sent out a party from
his camp to procure food, and AEmilius, who happened to hold the command
that day, sent out a strong force to intercept them. He was successful.
The Carthaginian detachment was routed. Nearly two thousand men were
killed, and the rest fled, by any roads they could find, back to
Hannibal's camp. Varro was very eager to follow them there, but AEmilius
ordered his men to halt. He was afraid of some trick or treachery- on
the part of Hannibal, and was disposed to be satisfied with the victory
he had already won.
This little success, however, only inflamed Varro's ardor for a battle,
and produced a general enthusiasm in the Roman army; and, a day or two
afterward, a circumstance occurred which raised this excitement to the
highest pitch. Some reconnoiterers, who had been stationed within sight
of Hannibal's camp to watch the motions and indications there, sent in
word to the consuls that the Carthaginian guards around their encampment
had all suddenly disappeared, and that a very extraordinary and unusual
silence reigned within. Parties of the Roman soldiers went up gradually
and cautiously to the Carthaginian lines, and soon found that the camp
was deserted, though the fires were still burning and the tents
remained. This intelligence, of course, put the whole Roman army into a
fever of excitement and agitation. They crowded around the consuls'
pavilions, and clamorously insisted on being led on to take possession
of the camp, and to pursue the enemy. “He has fled," they said, "and
with such precipitation that he has left the tents standing and his
fires still burning. Lead us on in pursuit of him."
Varro was as much excited as the rest. He was eager for action. AEmilius
hesitated. He made particular inquires. He said they ought to proceed
with caution.
Finally, he called up a certain prudent and sagacious officer, named
Statilius, and ordered him to take a small body of horsemen, ride over
to the Carthaginian camp, ascertain the facts exactly, and report the
result. Statilius did so. When he reached the lines he ordered his
troops to halt, and took with him two horsemen on whose courage and
strength he could rely, and rode in. The three horsemen rode around the
camp and examined every thing with a view of ascertaining whether
Hannibal had really abandoned his position and fled, or whether some
stratagem was intended.
When he came back he reported to the army that, in his opinion, the
desertion of the camp was not real, but a trick to draw the Romans into
some difficulty. The fires were the largest on the side toward the
Romans, which indicated that they were built to deceive. He saw money,
too, and other valuables strewed about upon the ground, which appeared
to him much more like a bait set in a trap, than like property abandoned
by fugitives as incumbrances to flight. Varro was not convinced; and the
army, hearing of the money, were excited to a greater eagerness for
plunder. They could hardly be restrained. Just then, however, two slaves
that had been taken prisoners by the Carthaginians some time before came
into the Roman camp. They told the consuls that the whole Carthaginian
force was hidden in ambush very near, waiting for the Romans to enter
their encampment, when they were going to surround them and cut them to
pieces. In the bustle and movement attendant on this plan, the slaves
had escaped. Of course, the Roman army were now satisfied. They
returned, chagrined and disappointed, to their own quarters, and
Hannibal, still more chagrined and disappointed, returned to his.
He soon found, however, that he could not remain any longer where he
was. His provisions were exhausted, and he could obtain no more. The
Roman would not come out of their encampment to give him battle on equal
terms, and they were too strongly in trenched to be attacked where they
were. He determined, therefore, to evacuate that part of the country,
and move, by a sudden march, into Apulia.
Apulia was on the eastern side of Italy. The River Aufidus runs through
it, having a town named Cannae near its mouth. The region of the Aufidus
was a warm and sunny valley, which was now waving with ripening grain.
Being farther south than the place where he had been, and more exposed
to the influence of the sun, Hannibal thought that the crops would be
sooner ripe, and that, at least, he should have a new field to plunder.
He accordingly decided now to leave his camp in earnest, and move into
Apulia. He made the same arrangements as before, when his departure was
a mere pretense. He left tents pitched and fires burning, but marched
his army off the ground by night and secretly, so that the Romans did
not perceive his departure; and the next day, when they saw the
appearances of silence and solitude about the camp, they suspected
another deception, and made no move themselves. At length, however,
intelligence came that the long columns of Hannibal's army had been seen
already far to the eastward, and moving on as fast as possible, with all
their baggage. The Romans, after much debate and uncertainty, resolved
to follow. The eagles of the Apennines looked down upon the two great
moving masses, creeping slowly along through the forests and valleys
like swarms of insects, one following the other, led on by a strange but
strong attraction, drawing them toward each other when at a distance,
but kept asunder by a still stronger repulsion when near.
The Roman army came up with that of Hannibal on the River Aufidus, near
Cannae, and the two vast encampments were formed with all the noise and
excitement attendant on the movements of two great armies posting
themselves on the eve of a battle, in the neighborhood of each other. In
the Roman camp, the confusion was greatly aggravated by the angry
disputes which immediately arose between the consuls and their
respective adherents as to the course to be pursued. Varro insisted on
giving the Carthaginians immediate battle. AEmilius refused. Varro said
that he must protest against continuing any longer these inexcusable
delays, and insist on a battle. He could not consent to be responsible
any further for allowing Italy to lie at the mercy of such a scourge.
AEmilius replied that if Varro did precipitate a battle, he himself
protested against his rashness, and could not be, in any degree,
responsible for the result. The various officers took sides, some with
one consul and some with the other, but most with Varro. The dissension
filled the camp with excitement, agitation, and ill will.
In the mean time, the inhabitants of the country into which these two
vast hordes of ferocious, though restrained and organized combatants,
had made such a sudden irruption, were flying as fast as they could from
the awful scene which they expected was to ensue. They carried from
their villages and cabins what little property could be saved, and took
the women and children away to retreats and fastnesses, wherever they
imagined they could find temporary concealment or protection. The news
of the movement of the two armies spread throughout the country, carried
by hundreds of refugees and messengers, and all Italy, looking on with
suspense and anxiety, awaited the result.
The armies maneuvered for a day or two, Varro, during his term of
command, making arrangements td promote and favor an action, and
AEmilius, on the following day, doing every thing in his power to
prevent it. In the end, Varro succeeded. The lines were formed and the
battle must be begun. AEmilius gave up the contest now, and while he
protested earnestly against the course which Varro pursued, he prepared
to do all in his power to prevent a defeat, since there was no longer a
possibility of avoiding a collision.
The battle began, and the reader must imagine the scene, since no pen
can describe it. Fifty thousand men on one side and eighty thousand on
the other, at work hard and steadily, for six hours, killing each other
by every possible means of destruction,--stabs, blows, struggles,
outcries, shouts of anger and defiance, and screams of terror and agony,
all mingled together, in one general din, which covered the whole
country for an extent of many miles, all together constituted a scene of
horror of which none but those who have witnessed great battles can form
any adequate idea.
It seems as if Hannibal could do nothing without stratagem. In the early
part of this conflict he sent a large body of his troops over to the
Romans as deserters. They threw down their spears and bucklers, as they
reached the Roman lines, in token of surrender. The Romans received
them, opened a passage for them through into the rear, and ordered them
to remain there. As they were apparently unarmed, they left only a very
small guard to keep them in custody. The men had, however, daggers
concealed about their dress, and, watching a favorable moment, in the
midst of the battle, they sprang to their feet, drew out their weapons,
broke away from their guard, and attacked the Romans in the rear at a
moment when they were so pressed by the enemy in front that they could
scarcely maintain their ground.
It was evident before many hours that the Roman forces were every where
yielding. From slowly and reluctantly yielding they soon began to fly.
In the flight, the weak and the wounded were trampled Under foot by the
throng who were pressing on behind them, or were dispatched by wanton
blows from enemies as they passed in pursuit of those who were still
able to fly. In the midst of this scene, a Roman officer named Lentulus,
as he was riding away, saw before him at the road-side another officer
wounded, sitting upon a stone, faint and bleeding. He stopped when he
reached him, and found that it was the consul Amilius. He had been
wounded in the head with a sling, and his strength was almost gone.
Lentulus offered him his horse, and urged him to take it and fly.
AEmilius declined the offer. He said it was too late for his life to be
saved, and that, besides, he had no wish to save it. "Go on, therefore,
yourself," said he, "as fast as you can. Make the best of your way to
Rome. Tell the authorities there, from me, that all is lost, and they
must do whatever they can themselves for the defense of the city. Make
all the speed you can, or Hannibal will be at the gates before you.
AEmilius sent also a message to Fabius, declaring to him that it was not
his fault that a battle had been risked with Hannibal. He had done all
in his power, he said, to prevent it, and had adhered to the policy
which Fabius had recommended to the last. Lentulus having received these
messages, and perceiving that the Carthaginians were close upon him in
pursuit, rode away, leaving the consul to his fate. The Carthaginians
came on, and, on seeing the wounded man, they thrust their spears into
his body, one after another, as they passed, until his limbs ceased to
quiver. As for the other consul, Varro, he escaped with his life.
Attended by about seventy horsemen, he made his way to a fortified town
not very remote from the battle-field, where he halted with his
horsemen, and determined that he would attempt to rally there the
remains of the army.
The Carthaginians, when they found the victory complete, abandoned the
pursuit of the enemy, returned to their camp, spent some hours in
feasting and rejoicing, and then lay down to sleep. They were, of
course, well exhausted by the intense exertions of the day. On the field
where the battle had been fought, the wounded lay all night mingled with
A the dead, filling the air with cries and groans, and writhing in their
agony.
Early the next morning the Carthaginians came back to the field to
plunder the dead bodies of the Romans. The whole field presented a most
shocking spectacle to the view. The bodies of horses and men lay mingled
in dreadful confusion, as they had fallen, some dead, others still
alive, the men moaning, crying for water, and feebly struggling from
time to time to disentangle themselves from the heaps of carcasses under
which they were buried. The deadly and inextinguishable hate which the
Carthaginians felt for their foes not having been appeased by the
slaughter of forty thousand of them; they beat down and stabbed these
wretched lingerers wherever they found them, as a sort of morning
pastime after the severer labors of the preceding day. This slaughter,
however, could hardly be considered a cruelty to the wretched victims of
it, for many of them bared their breasts to their assailants, and begged
for the blow which was to put an end to their pain. In exploring the
field, one Carthaginian soldier was found still alive, but imprisoned by
the dead body of his Roman enemy lying upon him. The Carthaginian's face
and ears were shockingly mangled. The Roman, having fallen upon him when
both were mortally wounded, had continued the combat. with his teeth
when he could no longer use his weapon, and had died at last, binding
down his exhausted enemy with his own dead body.
The Carthaginians secured a vast amount of plunder. The Roman army was
full of officers and soldiers from the aristocratic ranks of society,
and their arms and their dress were very valuable. The Carthaginians
obtained some bushels of gold rings from their fingers, which Hannibal
sent to Carthage as a trophy of his victory. |
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