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 THE
APENNINES.
As sooty as Hannibal was apprised in the morning
that Scipio and his forces had left their ground, he pressed on after
them, very earnest to overtake them before they should reach the rivers
but he was too late. The main body of the Roman army had got over. There
was, however, a detachment of a few hundred men, who had been left on
Hannibal's side of the river to guard the bridge until all the army
should have passed, and then to help in cutting it away. They had
accomplished this before. Hannibal's arrival, but had not had time to
contrive any way to get across the river themselves. Hannibal took them
all prisoners.
The condition and prospects of both the Roman and
Carthaginian cause were entirely changed by this battle and the retreat
of Scipio across the Po. All the nations of the north of Italy, who had
been subjects or allies of the Romans, now turned to Hannibal. They sent
embassies into his camp, offering him their friendship and alliance. In
fact, there was a large body of Gauls in the Roman camp, who were
fighting under Scipio at the battle of Ticinus, who deserted his
standard immediately afterward, and cane over in a mass to Hannibal.
They made this revolt in the night, and, instead of stealing away
secretly, they raised a prodigious tumult, killed the guards, filled the
encampment with their shouts and outcries, and created for a time an
awful scene of terror.
Hannibal received them, but he was too sagacious to
admit such a treacherous horde into his army. He treated them with great
consideration and kindness, and dismissed them with presents, that they
might all go to their respective homes, charging them to exert their
influence in his favor among the tribes to which they severally
belonged.
Hannibal's soldiers, too, were very much encouraged
by the commencement they had made. The army made immediate preparations
for crossing the river. Some of the soldiers built rafts; others went up
the stream in search of places to ford. Some swam across. They could
adopt these or any other modes in safety, for the Romans made no stand
on the opposite bank to oppose them, but moved rapidly on, as fast as
Scipio could be carried. His wounds began to inflame, and were extremely
painful.
In fact, the Romans were dismayed at the danger
which now threatened them. As soon as news of these events reached the
city, the authorities there sent a dispatch immediately to Sicily to
recall the other consul. His name was Sempronius. It will be recollected
that, when the lots were cast between him and Scipio, it fell to Scipio
to proceed to Spain, with a view to arresting Hannibal's march, while
Sempronius went to Sicily and Africa. The object of this movement was to
threaten and attack the Carthaginians at home, in order to distract
their attention and prevent their sending any fresh forces to aid
Hannibal, and, perhaps, even to compel them to recall hire from Italy to
defend their own capital. But now that Hannibal had not only passed the
Alps, but had also crossed the Po, and was marching toward Rome-Scipio
himself disabled and his army flying before him they were obliged at
once to abandon the plan of threatening Carthage. They sent with all
dispatch an order to Sempronius to hasten home and assist in the defense
of Rome.
Sempronius was a man of a very prompt and impetuous
character, with great confidence in his own powers, and very ready for
action. He came immediately into Italy, recruited new soldiers for the
army, put himself at the head of his forces, and marched northward to
join Scipio in the valley of the Po. Scipio was suffering great pain
from his wound, and could do but little toward directing the operations
of the army. He had slowly retreated before Hannibal, the fever and pain
of his wound being greatly exasperated by the motion of traveling. In
this manner he arrived at the Trebia, a small stream flowing northward
into the Po. He crossed this stream, and finding that he could not go
any further, on account of the torturing pain to which it put him to be
moved, he halted his army, marked out an encampment, threw up
fortifications around it, and prepared to make a stand. To his great
relief, Sempronius soon came up and joined him here.
There were now two generals. Napoleon used to say
that one bad commander was better than two good ones, so essential is it
to success in all military operations to secure that promptness, and
confidence, and decision which can only exist where action is directed
by one single mind. Sempronius and Scipio disagreed as to the proper
course to be pursued. Sempronius wished to attack Hannibal immediately.
Scipio was in favor of delay. Sempronius attributed Scipio's reluctance
to give battle to the dejection of mind and discouragement produced by
his wound, or to a feeling of envy lest he, Sempronius, should have the
honor of conquering the Carthaginians, while he himself was helpless in
his tent. On the other hand, Scipio thought Semprcnius inconsiderate and
reckless, and disposed to rush heedlessly into a contest with a foe
whose powers and resources he did not understand.
In the mean time, while the two commanders were
thus divided in opinion, some skirmishes and small engagements took
place between detachments from the two armies, in which Sempronius
thought that the Romans had the advantage. This excited his enthusiasm
more and more, and he became extremely desirous to bring on a general
battle. He began to be quite out of patience with Scipio's caution and
delay. The soldiers, he said, were full of strength and courage, all
eager for the combat, and it was absurd to hold them back on account of
the feebleness of one sick man. "Besides," said he, "of what use can it
be to delay any longer? We are as ready to meets the Carthaginians now
as we shall ever be. There is no third consul to come and help us; and
what a disgrace it is for us Romans, who in the former war led our
troops to the very gates of Carthage, to allow Hannibal to bear sway
over all the north of Italy, while we retreat gradually before trim,
afraid to en counter now a force that we have always conquered before."
Hannibal was not long in learning, through his
spies, that there was this difference of opinion between the Roman
generals, and that Sempronius was full of a presumptuous sort of ardor
and he began to think that he could contrive some plan to draw the
latter out into battle under circumstances in which he would have to act
at a great disadvantage. He did contrive such a plan. It succeeded
admirably; and the case was one of those numerous instances which
occurred in the history of Hannibal, of successful stratagem, which led
the Romans to say that his leading traits of character were treachery
and cunning.
Hannibal's plan was, in a word, an attempt to draw
the Roman army out of its encampment on a dark, cold, and stormy night
in December, and get them into the river. This river was the Trebia. It
flowed north into the Po, between the Roman and Carthaginian camps. His
scheme, in detail, was to send a part of his army over the river to
attack the Romans in the night or very early in the morning. He hoped
that by this means Sempronius would be induced to come out of his camp
to attack the Carthaginians. The Carthaginians were then to fly and
re-cross the river, and Hannibal hoped that Sempronius would follow,
excited by the ardor of pursuit. Hannibal was then to have a strong
reserve of the army that had remained all the time in warmth and safety,
to come out and attack the Romans with unimpaired strength and vigor,
while the Romans themselves would be benumbed by the cold and wet, and
disorganized by the confusion produced in crossing the stream.
A part of Hannibal's reserve were to be placed in
an ambuscade. There were some meadows near the water, which were covered
in many places with tall grass and bushes. Hannibal went to examine the
spot, and found that this shrubbery was high enough for even horsemen to
be concealed in it. He determined to place a thousand foot soldiers and
a thousand horsemen here, the most efficient and courageous in the army.
He selected them in the following manner:
He called one of his lieutenant generals to the
spot, explained somewhat of his design to him, and then asked him to go
and choose from the cavalry and the infantry, a hundred each, the best
soldiers he could find. This two hundred were then assembled, and
Hannibal, after surveying them with looks of approbation and pleasure,
said, "Yes, you are the men I want, only, instead of two hundred, I need
two thousand. Go back to the army, and select and bring to me, each of
you, nine men like yourselves." It is easy to be imagined that the
soldiers were pleased with this commission; and that they executed it
faithfully. The whole force thus chosen was soon assembled, and
stationed in the thickets above described, where they lay in ambush
ready to attack the Romans after they should pass the river.
Hannibal also made arrangements for leaving a large
part of his army in his own camp, ready for battle, with orders that
they should partake of food and refreshments and keep themselves warm by
the fires until they should be called upon. All things being thus ready,
he detached a body of horsemen to cross the river, and see if they could
provoke the Romans to come out of their camp and pursue them.
" Go," said Hannibal, to the commander of this
detachment, "pass the stream, advance to the Roman camp, assail the
guards, and when the army forms and comes out to attack you, retreat
slowly before them back across the river."
The detachment did as it was ordered to do. When
they arrived at the camp, which was soon after break of day,-for it was
a part of Hannibal's plan to bring the Romans out before they should
have had time to breakfast, Sempronius, at the first alarm, called all
the soldiers to arms, supposing that the whole Carthaginian force was
attacking them. It was a cold and stormy morning, and the atmosphere
being filled with rain and snow, but little could be seen. Column after
column of horsemen and of infantry marched out of the camp. The
Carthaginians retreated. Sempronius was greatly excited at the idea of
so easily driving back the assailants, and, as they retreated, he
pressed on in pursuit of them. As Hannibal had anticipated, he became so
excited in the pursuit that he did not stop at the banks of the river.
The Carthaginian horsemen plunged into the stream in their retreat, and
the Romans, foot soldiers and horsemen, together, followed on. The
stream was usually small, but it was now swelled by the rain which had
been falling all the night. The water was, of course, intensely cold.
The horsemen got through tolerably well, but the foot soldiers were all
thoroughly drenched and benumbed; and as they had not taken any food
that morning, and had come forth on a very sudden call, and without any
sufficient preparation, they felt the effects of the exposure in the
strongest degree. Still they pressed on. They ascended the bank after
crossing the river, and when they had formed again there, and were
moving forward in pursuit of their still flying enemy, suddenly the
whole force of Hannibal's reserves, strong and vigorous, just from their
tents and their fires, burst upon them. They had scarcely recovered from
the astonishment and the shock of this unexpected onset, when the two
thousand concealed in the ambuscade came sallying forth in the storm,
and assailed the Romans in the rear with frightful shouts and outcries.
All these movements took place very rapidly. Only a
very short period elapsed from the time that the Roman army, officers
and soldiers, were quietly sleeping in their camp, or rising slowly to
prepare for the routine of an ordinary day, before they found themselves
all drawn out in battle array some miles from their encampment, and
surrounded and hemmed in by their foes. The events succeeded each other
so rapidly as to appear to the soldiers like a dream; but very soon
their wet and freezing clothes, their limbs benumbed and stiffened, the
sleet which was driving along the plain, the endless lines of
Carthaginian infantry, hemming them in on all sides, and the columns of
horsemen and of elephants charging upon them, convinced them that their
situation was one of dreadful reality. The calamity, too, which
threatened them was of vast extent, as well as imminent and terrible;
for, though the stratagem of Hannibal was very simple in its plan and
management, still he had executed it on a great scale, and had brought
out the whole Roman army. There were, it is said, about forty thousand
that crossed the river, and about an equal number in the Carthaginian
army to oppose them. Such a body of combatants covered, of course, a
large extent of ground, and the conflict that ensued was one of the most
terrible scenes of the many that Hannibal assisted in enacting.
The conflict continued for many hours, the Romans
getting more and more into confusion all the time. The elephants of the
Carthaginians, that is, the few that few remained, made great havoc in
their ranks, and finally, after a combat of some hours, the whole army
was broken up and fled, some portions in compact bodies, as their
officers could keep them together, and others in hopeless and
inextricable con: fusion. They made their way back to the river, which
they reached at various points up and down the stream. In the mean time,
the continued rain had swollen the waters still more, the low lands were
overflowed, the deep places concealed, and the broad expanse of water in
the center of the stream whirled in boiling and turbid eddies, whose
surface was roughened by the December breeze, and dotted every
where with the drops of rain still falling.
When the Roman army was thoroughly broken up and
scattered, the Carthaginians gave up the further prosecution of the
contest. They were too wet, cold, and exhausted themselves to feel any
ardor in the pursuit of their enemies. Vast numbers of the Romans,
however, attempted to re-cross the river, and were swept down and
destroyed by the merciless flood, whose force they had not strength
enough remaining to withstand. Other portions of the troops lay hid in
lurking-places to which they had retreated, until night came on, and
then they made rafts on which they contrived to float themselves back
across the stream. Hannibal's troops were too wet, and cold, and
exhausted to go out again into the storm, and so they were unmolested in
these attempts. Notwithstanding this, however, great numbers of them
were carried down the stream and lost.
It was now December, too late for Hannibal to
attempt to advance much farther that season, and yet the way before him
was open to the Apennines, by the defeat of Sempronius, for neither he
nor Scipio could now hope to make another stand against him till they
should receive new re-enforcements from Rome. During the winter months
Hannibal had various battles and adventures, sometimes with portions and
detachments of the Roman army, and sometimes with the native tribes. He
was sometimes in great difficulty for want of food for his army, until
at length he bribed the governor of a castle, where a Roman granary was
kept, to deliver it up to him, and after that he was well supplied.
The natives of the country were, however, not at
all well disposed toward him, and in the course of the winter they
attempted to impede his operations, and to harass his army by every
means in their power. Finding his situation uncomfortable, he moved on
toward the south, and at length determined that, inclement as the season
was, he would cross the Apennines.
By looking at the map of Italy, it will be seen
that the great valley of the Po extends across the whole north of Italy.
The valley of the Arno and of the Umbro lies south of it, separated from
it by a part of the Apennine chain. This southern valley was Etruria.
Hannibal decided to attempt to pass over the mountains into Etruria. He
thought he should find there a warmer climate, and inhabitants more well
disposed toward him, besides being so much nearer Rome.
But, though Hannibal conquered the Alps, the
Apennines conquered him. A very violent storm arose just as he reached
the most exposed place among the mountains. It was intensely cold, and
the wind blew the hail and snow directly into the faces of the troops,
so that it was impossible for them to proceed. They halted and turned
their backs to the storm, but the wind increased more and more, and was
attended with terrific thunder and lightning, which filled the soldiers
with alarm, as they were at such an altitude as to be themselves
enveloped in the clouds from which the peals and flashes were emitted.
Unwilling retreat, Hannibal ordered the army to encamp on the spot, in
the best shelter they could find. They attempted, accordingly, to pitch
their tents, but it was impossible to secure them. The wind increased to
a hurricane. The tent poles were unmanageable, and the canvas was
carried away from its fastenings, and sometimes split or blown into rags
by its flapping in the wind. The poor elephants, that is, all that were
left of them from previous battles and exposures, sank down under this
intense cold and died. One only remained alive.
Hannibal ordered a retreat, and the army went back
into the valley of the Po. But Hannibal was ill at ease here. The
natives of the country were very weary of his presence. His army
consumed their food ravaged their country, and destroyed all their peace
and happiness. Hannibal suspected them of a design to poison him or
assassinate him in some other way. He was continually watching and
taking precautions against these attempts. He had a great many different
dresses made to be used as disguises, and false hair of different colors
and fashion, so that he could alter his appearance at pleasure. This was
to prevent any spy or assassin who might come into his camp from
identifying him by any description of his dress and appearance. Still,
notwithstanding these precautions, he was ill at ease, and at the very
earliest practicable period in the spring he made a new attempt to cross
the mountains, and was now successful.
On descending the southern declivities of the
Apennines he learned that a new Roman army, under a new consul, was
advancing toward him from the south. He was eager to meet this force,
and was preparing to press forward at once by the nearest way. He found,
however, that this would lead him across the lower part of the valley of
the Arno, which was here very broad, and, though usually passable, was
now overflowed in consequence of the swelling of the waters of the river
by the melting of the snows upon the mountains. The whole country was
now, in fact, a vast expanse of marshes and fens.
Still, Hannibal concluded to cross it, and, in the
attempt, he involved his army in difficulties and dangers as great,
almost, as he had encountered upon the Alps. The waters were rising
continually; they filled all the channels and spread over extended
plains. They were so turbid, too, that every thing beneath the surface
was concealed, and the soldiers wading in them were continually sinking
into deep and sudden channels and into bogs of mire, where many were
lost. They were all exhausted and worn out by the wet and cold, and the
long continuance of their exposure to it. They were four days and three
nights in this situation, as their progress was, of course, extremely
slow. The men, during all this time, had scarcely any sleep, and in some
places the only way by which they could get any repose was to lay their
arms and their baggage in the standing water, so as to build, by this
means, a sort of couch or platform on which they could lie. Hannibal
himself was sick too. He was attacked with a violent inflammation of the
eyes, and the sight of one of them was in the end destroyed. He was not,
however, so much exposed as the other officers; for there was one
elephant left of all those that had commenced the march In Spain, and
Hannibal rode this elephant during the four days march through the
water. There were guides and attendants to precede him, for the purpose
of finding a safe and practicable road, and by their aid, with the help
of the animal's sagacity, he got safely through.
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